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Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s'
and Lynn S. Scott*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys noteworthy cases in the areas of corporate,
limited liability company, partnership, and agency law decided between
June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2010' by the Georgia Supreme Court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia. In addition to surveying decisions by Georgia courts and
federal courts located in Georgia, this Article discusses an important
decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.
II.

CORPORATIONS

A. Supreme Court of the United States Addresses Corporate
Citizenship
In Hertz v. Friend,' the Supreme Court held that the nerve center test
is the proper test to use in determining a corporation's principal place
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of business for diversity jurisdiction purposes, thereby resolving a split
among the circuit courts.' The United States Constitution provides that
Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction,
allowing federal courts to assert jurisdiction over citizens of different
states.' Accordingly, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1332,' which
establishes federal jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different
states." In determining if there is diversity of citizenship between the
parties, giving rise to federal jurisdiction, the citizenship of each party
must be determined.' For persons, citizenship is determined by the
state in which the person is domiciled.' For corporations, citizenship is
determined by the state in which a corporation is incorporated and the
state where the corporation has its principal place of business.9
Interpretation of the term "principal place of business" was left to the
courts because § 1332 itself did not provide a definition."o As a result,
courts developed two main tests for determining a corporation's principal
place of business: the "nerve center test" and the "business activities
test."n
Under the nerve center test, a corporation's principal place of business
is the state "where [the] corporation's officers direct, control, and

3. Id. at 1192.
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The rationale for allowing federal courts to have
jurisdiction based solely on diversity is so that out-of-state parties do not suffer local
prejudice during the judicial process. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188.
5. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646,62 Stat. 930 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2006)).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(aXl) (2006).
7. Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. Id. at 1399.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(cXl). The initial approach taken by the Supreme Court was that
a corporation was a citizen of the state in which it was incorporated. See Louisville,
Cincinnati, & Charleston RR. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844) (holding a corporation
is a citizen of the state of its incorporation); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S.
314, 325 (1853) (reaffirming Letson). However, many corporations were abusing this
approach. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928) (holding a corporation's motives in reincorporating
were not a factor in determining diversity jurisdiction). In response to this fraud and
abuse, Congress codified § 1332(cXl), which established a corporation would also be a
citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(cX1)).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
11. See Hertz, 130 8. Ct. at 1191-94. A third test, sometimes referred to as the total
activities test, developed as a result of courts combining aspects of both the nerve center
and business activities tests. See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162 (6th Cir.
1993).
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coordinate the corporation's activities."" In contrast, the business
activities test evaluates a number of different factors to determine if a
corporation's business activities in one state "substantially predominate[" over the business activities in other states.1 3 These factors
include "the location of employees, tangible property, production
activities, sources of income, and where sales take place."" Prior to
Hertz, the circuit courts had split on which test to use to determine a
corporation's principal place of business. The question presented in
Hertz was which one of these tests is the proper one to apply.'e
In Hertz two California citizens sued the Hertz Corporation (Hertz) in
California state court for violating California's hour and wage laws.
Hertz filed a notice of removal, claiming that because Hertz was diverse
from the plaintiffs, the federal courts were available to it. Hertz
supported this claim by submitting a declaration listing its principal
place of business as New Jersey, the state where Hertz maintained its
corporate offices.' The United States District Court for the Northern
District of California held Hertz's principal place of business to be
California based on the amount of business Hertz did in California. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision."
In light of the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari "[in
an effort to find a single, more uniform interpretation of the .. . phrase"
"principal place of business."'" The Supreme Court reviewed the
different approaches and ultimately held that a corporation's principal

12. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192.
13. Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001). This
test does not require a state to have a majority of the corporation's business activities in
order to be considered its principal place of business. Id. Rather, the business activities
in a particular state must be significantly more than in any other state. Id.
14. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
15. Compare id. (applying business activities test and noting the nerve center test is
only used in the event there is no one state that substantially predominates), DiazRodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying business activities
test), and Amoco Roemount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 915 (10th Cir. 1993)
(applying business activities test), with Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d
1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying nerve center test), and Scot Typewriter Co. v.
Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (applying nerve center test).
16. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186-86.
17. Id at 1186. The declaration stated Hertz did business in 44 states and that
California "accounted for 273 of Hertz's 1,606 car rental locations; about 2,300 of its 11,230
full-time employees; about $811 million of its $4.371 billion in annual revenue; and about
3.8 million of its approximately 21 million annual transactions, i.e., rentals." Id.
18. Id. at 1186-87.
19. Id. at 1192.
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place of business should be determined using the nerve center test.20
The Supreme Court concluded that "'principal place of business' is best
read as referring to the place where a corporation's officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation's activities."2' The Supreme
Court offered three main reasons to support its holding: 1) statutory
language, 2) simplicity and predictability, and 3) legislative history.'
First, the phrase "principal place of business" requires that a court select
the one "'main, prominent' . . . place .

..

within a [sitate [but] not the

[sitate itself."" Under the business activities test, courts were looking
to the state rather than the corporation's place of business within the
state.2 Second, complex tests such as the business activities test only
complicate a case and waste a litigant's time and money when trying to
determine if a particular court has jurisdiction.2 ' However, the nerve
center test offers a predictable way for the parties to make decisions.'
Finally,judicial history suggests Congress enacted the statute to provide
simplicity and practicality.2
The Supreme Court noted that there is "no perfect test that satisfies
all administrative and purposive criteria."' For example, the Hertz
nerve center test may present difficulties in situations where a
corporation divides its overall command and control throughout different
offices in different states.' However, the test still requires courts to
look "in a single direction, towards the center of overall direction,
control, and coordination."so The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and held diversity jurisdiction existed between the California
citizens and Hertz because under the nerve center test, Hertz's principal
place of business was New Jersey, not California."
The main implication of the Supreme Court's decision in Hertz is that
corporations may now be more confident that the federal courts will be
available when filing a notice of removal based on diversity jurisdiction

20. Id. at 1190-92.
21. Id. at 1192.
22. Id. at 1192-94.
23. Id. at 1192-93.
24. Id. at 1193.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1193-94.
27. Id. at 1194.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also noted there may be situations in
which the nerve center test cuts against the basic rationale of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Id. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the need for a "clearer rule" trumps those
rare cases. Id.
31. Id. at 1195.
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(or when bringing an action in federal court based on diversity). The
nerve center test should provide corporations a simpler way to determine
their principal place of business. However, while the Supreme Court's
opinion points courts to the "center of overall direction, control, and
coordination," there will likely be room for interpretation of "direction,
control, and coordination."32 One may envision a situation in which a
corporation has nerve centers in two different states with one nerve
center controlling and coordinating production and the other controlling
and coordinating the financial and business decisions of the corporation.
Thus, while the Supreme Court's decision in Hertz offers a simpler test,
there may still be further clarification to come regarding the exact
meaning of "nerve center."

B. Piercingthe Corporate Veil
1. Georgia Courts Continue to Reject Theory of Outsider
Reverse Veil Piercing. In Otero v. Vito,' the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia applied the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision in Acree v. McMahan' on behalf of a third-party
creditor who sought to recover from a corporate entity for the debts of its
owner.35 In Otero George R. Vito (Dr. Vito) set up a series of entities
(Vito Entities) "in a deliberate strategy to put his assets out of the reach
Dr. Vito
of his creditors without losing control of those assets."'
testified that he used corporations, limited liability companies, and
trusts, as well as the names of his brothers and father, to shield his
personal assets from attachment by his creditors." The Vito Entities
were primarily used "to place legal title to Dr. Vito's real estate . .. and
personal property in the name of third parties" as well as to pay for Dr.
Furthermore, evidence in the record
Vito's personal expenses."
indicated that income from Dr. Vito's podiatry practice supported the
other Vito Entities and that Dr. Vito had commingled the funds of all

32. Id. at 1194.
33. No. 5:07-cv-405 (CAR), 2009 WL 3063426 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2009).
34. 276 Ga. 880, 585 S.E.2d 873 (2003). The supreme court in Acree held that an
"'outsider,' such as a third-party creditor, [cannot] pierce the veil in order to reach a
corporation's assets to satisfy claims against an individual corporate insider." Id. at 881,
585 S.E.2d at 874.
35. Otero, 2009 WL 3063426, at *6.
36. Id. at *1-2.
37. Id. at *2. Although his brothers and father were listed as officers and shareholders,
the undisputed evidence established that Dr. Vito maintained sole and complete control
over the Vito Entities. Id. at *4.
38. Id. at *5.
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the Vito Entities." The strategies Dr. Vito used to maintain the Vito
Entities included "using loans and security agreements to tie up
accounts receivable, using proceeds from loans to purchase annuities and
real property, and using cash flow from the businesses to repay the loans
creating equity in the real property and cash value in the annuities.o
Given the complete unity of interest between Dr. Vito and the Vito
Entities, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on his claim that the Vito Entities constituted alter egos of Dr.
Vito." However, the court did not pierce the corporate veil in this case
because Georgia law does not recognize a claim for outsider "reverse veilpiercing,"42 and a third-party creditor cannot "satisfy the debts of an
individual out of [a} corporation's assets."' Instead, the court applied
the Georgia Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA)" to the case.a
The court found the Vito Entities "had no legitimate [purpose] and no
income other than through fraudulent transfers."46 Therefore, the
transfers of Dr. Vito's real estate and personal property to the Vito
Entities were voidable under the UFTA.4 ' The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff creditor and ordered the Vito Entities'
assets to be considered Dr. Vito's assets in bankruptcy."
The decision in Otero illustrates Georgia's reluctance to incorporate
outsider reverse veil-piercing into Georgia corporate law. In cases like
Otero,plaintiff claimants in Georgia must rely on legal remedies such as
the UFTA to obtain a judgment in their favor.
2. Georgia Court of Appeals Upholds Jury Verdicts Piercing
the Corporate Veil in Two Cases. In Anthony v. Gator Cochran
Construction, Inc.," the court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict,

39. Id. at *6.
40. Id. at *2.
41. Id. at *1.
42. Id. at *6 (quoting Acree, 276 Ga. at 881, 585 S.E.2d at 874) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43. Acree, 276 Ga. at 881, 585 S.E.2d at 874 (emphasis omitted) (quoting C.F. Trust,
Inc. v. First Flight, L.P., 306 F.3d 126, 134 (4th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
44. O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-70 to -80 (2010).
45. Otero, 2009 WL 3063426, at *7.
46. Id. at *11.
47. Id. The transfers were void pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 18-2-77(a)(1), or if the transfers
occurred before July 1, 2002, they were void pursuant to Georgia's prior fraudulent
transfers law, O.C.G.A. § 18-2-22 (repealed 2002). Otero, 2009 WL 3063426, at *11.
48. Otero, 2009 WL 3063426, at *11.
49. 299 Ga. App. 126, 682 S.E.2d 140 (2009), cert.granted. The decision in Anthony is
currently under review by the Georgia Supreme Court. See id.
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concluding that a group of five related entities and their owner were
jointly and severally liable for the debts of the collective group.o Gator
Cochran Construction, Inc. (Cochran), a construction and fabrication
company, started its business with an investment from Ray Anthony.
In return for the investment, Cochran did work for several companies
owned by Anthony (collectively "the Anthony Entities"). Over the course
of their dealings, the Anthony Entities failed to pay Cochran for certain
invoices as they became due, ultimately accumulating a debt of
$606,747.96. Cochran filed suit, seeking to recover the monies owed for
the unpaid invoices. Finding the Anthony Entities to be alter egos of
each other, the jury awarded damages to Cochran in the full amount of
the debt of the Anthony Entities jointly or severally." The Anthony
Entities moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The motion was denied, and the Anthony Entities
appealed.5 2
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals cited
language from Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson,' stating that to
prevail on a veil-piercing claim, "it is necessary to show that the
shareholders disregarded the corporate entity and made it a mere
instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of
the corporation and the owners no longer exist."" The court discovered
evidence in the record that the Anthony Entities, and Anthony personalSpecifically, "'entwined' their finances and dealings with Cochran."
and
another,
by
paid
often
were
entity
Anthony
by
one
sent
ly, invoices
be
would
invoices
which
decided
he
that
testified
himself
Ray Anthony
the
addition,
In
pay
it."
would
Entities
Anthony
the
of
which
paid and
court noted that Anthony provided further evidence of the commingling
of the Anthony Entities' funds when he asked, "[w]hy do I have to take

50. Id. at 126-27, 682 S.E.2d at 141-42.
51. Id. at 126-27, 682 S.E.2d at 142. Certain Anthony Entities were also awarded
$141,422.46 based on their counterclaim for separate debt that Cochran owed them. Id.
at 127, 682 S.E.2d at 142.
52. Id. at 127, 682 S.E.2d at 142.
53. 279 Ga. 288, 612 S.E.2d 296 (2005).
54. Anthony, 299 Ga. App. at 127-28,682 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting Baillie, 279 Ga. at 28990, 612 S.E.2d at 299).
55. Id. at 128, 682 S.E.2d at 142; see J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design,
218 Ga. App. 459, 460, 462 S.E.2d 406, 407 (1995) (stating that commingling funds
interchangeably or confusing properties, records, or control of separate entities is evidence
that supports piercing the corporate veil).
56. Anthony, 299 Ga. App at 128, 682 S.E.2d at 143.
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it out of this pocket and put it in that pocket?" 7 In light of Anthony's
testimony and evidence supporting the amount of damages awarded by
the jury, the court of appeals held "the trial court did not err in denying
the Anthony Entities' motion.""
In Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,59 the court of appeals
affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the City of Atlanta (City) and against
a borrower's owner and CEO and a related corporation, holding the two
to be alter egos of each other.6 In August 1995 Simbic, Inc. (Simbic)
purchased the West Lake Apartment Complex (West Lake) from the
Lucky Rucker Aiken Foundation (Foundation)." In May 1999 Simbic
transferred its ownership interest in West Lake to Renee, Inc. (Renee)
However, Simbic
via quitclaim deed for a purchase price of $10.
"remained indebted to the Foundation under a Purchase Money Deed to
Secure Debt and Security Agreement.'" In August 1999 Joseph
Bickers," on behalf of Simbic, entered into a loan funding agreement
with the City in which the City agreed to loan Simbic up to $500,000 for
projects at West Lake. In October 2001 the City and Bickers, again on
behalf of Simbic, entered into another loan funding agreement that
provided up to $400,000 of additional funds.' By July 2002 the City
had issued "JT Bickers d/b/a Simbic-West Lake Court Apartments" a
series of checks totaling $ 7 3 1, 4 0 9 .' Bickers used these funds to pay
Simbic's debt to the Foundation67 and also to make improvements at
West Lake."
In 2004 Bickers and Simbic decided to sell West Lake to MGG
Properties, Inc. (MGG)." However, because Simbic transferred the
property to Renee in 1999, it was Renee who actually and legally sold
the property.o In the purchase and sale agreement, Renee represented
that it was responsible for the loan from the City and agreed it would

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 301 Ga. App. 254, 687 S.E.2d 233 (2009).
60. Id. at 254-55, 687 S.E.2d at 235.
61. Id. at 255, 687 S.E.2d at 236.
62. Id. at 255, 260, 687 S.E.2d at 236, 239.
63. Id. at 255, 687 S.E.2d at 236.
64. Bickers was owner and CEO of both Simbic and Renee. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 255-56, 687 S.E.2d at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Two checks issued by the City, each totaling $275,000, were endorsed by Bickers
for the Foundation. Id. at 256, 687 S.E.2d at 236. "After receiving [these] payment[s,] the
Foundation released its security interest in West Lake." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id at 260, 687 S.E.2d at 239.
70. Id. at 255, 260, 687 S.E.2d at 236, 239.
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pay the debt when it became due, even though Renee was not a party to
the loan funding agreements. The money loaned by the City to Bickers
was never repaid." At trial, the jury found that Bickers and Renee
were alter egos of Simbic and were unjustly enriched by the loans from
the City.72
The court of appeals upheld the jury verdict, holding the evidence
showed Bickers, Simbic, and Renee "disregarded the separateness of
legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or
confusing the otherwise separate properties, records[,] or control."73
The court reached its decision for four distinct reasons. First, Bickers
owned and served as CEO of both Simbic and Renee during the entire
period in question. Second, when Bickers began accepting loans from
the City on behalf of Simbic, Simbic had already transferred ownership
in West Lake to Renee." Third, Bickers used the money from the loans
to benefit both Simbic and Renee, paying the Foundation on behalf of
Simbic and paying for improvements at West Lake on behalf of
Renee.7 6 Finally, the court noted that Renee legally sold the property
to MGG even though Bickers and Simbic made the decision to sell.77
Thus, the opinions in both Anthony and Renee Unlimited, Inc. represent
fact patterns in which Georgia courts are likely to disregard the
corporate form.
3. Nonsignatory to Contract Bound by Contractual Choice of
Law Provision. In Rayonier Wood Products,LLC v. Scanware, Inc. ,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
held that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Georgia did not err in finding FinScan OY (FinScan) to be an alter ego
of ScanWare, Inc. and thus bound by ScanWare's contractual choice of
law provision.7 1 In May 2006, ScanWare entered into a contract with
Rayonier Wood Products (Rayonier) under which ScanWare would
provide Rayonier with a lumber grading system intended and expected
to perform better than 95% of similar systems conforming to industry

71. Id. at 256, 687 S.E.2d at 236.
72. Id. at 254, 687 S.E.2d at 235. Simbic was not a party at trial because the trial
court had previously entered default judgments against it. Id. at 255, 687 S.E.2d at 235.
73. Id. at 259-60, 687 S.E.2d at 238-39 (quoting Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 199 Ga. App.
303, 306, 404 S.E.2d 607, 610 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 255, 687 S.E.2d at 236.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 256, 687 S.E.2d at 236.
77. Id. at 260, 687 S.E.2d at 239.
78. 420 B.R. 915 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
79. Id. at 923.
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standards. The contract signed by the two parties included a choice of
law provision that required any dispute in connection with the contract
to be litigated in Emanuel County, Georgia. At the time the contract
was executed, FinScan held a minority ownership interest in ScanWare
and did not sign the contract.80
In July 2008 Rayonier filed suit against ScanWare and FinScan in the
Superior Court of Emanuel County, Georgia, after the lumber grading
system failed to meet industry standards. In October 2009 ScanWare
filed for bankruptcy, and FinScan subsequently filed a notice of removal
to bankruptcy court. Rayonier then filed a motion to remand the action
to state court based on the choice of law provision in the contract
between Rayonier and Scanware. The bankruptcy court granted
Rayonier's motion to remand, and FinScan appealed."
The district court noted that binding FinScan to the "choice of law
provision [would] effectively pierce[] the corporate veil" because FinScan
and ScanWare were two separate legal entities." However, the district
court nonetheless held the bankruptcy court properly granted Rayonier's
motion to remand," stating that "Georgia courts will pierce the
corporate veil to remedy injustices which arise where a party has
overextended [its] privilege ... to evade contractual or tort responsibility."' In this case, FinScan had only a minority interest in ScanWare
when ScanWare signed the contract.' However, this minority ownership indicated the parties' close relationship.' Additionally, FinScan
remained continuously and heavily involved in ScanWare's business:
Rayonier was in direct communication with FinScan employees from the
beginning of the business relationship, and FinScan's president served

80. Id. at 917-18. FinScan acquired 100% ownership of ScanWare in October 2007. Id.
at 918 n.2.
81. Id. at 918.
82. Id. at 922.
83. Id. at 925.
84. Id. at 922 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Garrett v. Women's Health Care, P.C., 243
Ga. App. 53, 56,532 S.E.2d 164, 168 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Compare
id., with Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a nonparty to a contract will be bound to the contract's forum selection clause
if the party is "closely related" to the dispute so that it is "foreseeable" the party will be
bound). Georgia law does not mirror the language used in Lipcon; however, the underlying
premise is the same: Georgia courts will pierce the corporate veil to remedy an injustice
caused by a corporation's avoidance of contractual liability. ScanWare, 420 B.R. at 922.
85. Scan Ware, 420 B.R. at 922.
86. Id.; see also Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1299 (quoting Dayhoff, Inc. v. HJ. Heinz Co., 86
F.3d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1996)) (noting "that a sister corporation that did not sign an ...
agreement could not be bound by [that] agreement, but. . .if (that] 'corporation's interests
were directly related to . .. the [signatory's] conduct,' the corporation" could be bound).
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as the president of ScanWare following its acquisition.'
Finally, the
lumber grading systems ScanWare sold appeared to be merely FinScan
machines with FinScan's logo and slogan appearing on the machine as
well as FinScan's address appearing in a footer on each page of the
instruction manual." Accordingly, the court concluded that ScanWare
was an alter ego of FinScan and that FinScan was therefore bound by
the contract's choice of law provision." The decision in ScanWare
illustrates that Georgia courts will not hesitate to bind a nonsignatory
to a contract if the court finds the signatory to be an alter ego of the
nonsignatory party.
C.

Fiduciary Duties

1. GTSA Claim Does Not Preempt Claims Made That Do Not
Involve the Misappropriation of Proprietary Information. In
ProfessionalEnergy Management, Inc. v. Necaise," the Georgia Court
of Appeals held the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990 (GTSA) 91 did not
preempt a claim for breach of fiduciary duty." Professional Energy
Management, Inc. (PEM) sued former PEM employee Ty Necaise, Robert
Allen, and LUMA Energy Resource Management, Inc. (LUMA), a
corporation formed by Necaise and Allen. PEM made several allegations
against Necaise, Allen, and LUMA, alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, breach of confidentiality and a nondisclosure agreement, and
violation of the GTSA. The trial court dismissed each of PEM's claims
except for the GTSA claim." Relying on the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia's decision in DiamondPowerInternational,
Inc. v. Davidson," the trial court found the GTSA claim preempted the
other claims PEM made."
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of PEM's nonGTSA claims." The court of appeals explained that while the district
court in Diamond Power held that claims conflicting with a GTSA claim

87. ScanWare, 420 B.R. at 922.
88. Id. at 922-23.
89. Id. at 923.
90. 300 Ga. App. 223, 684 S.E.2d 374 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
91. O.C.G.A. §§10-1-760 to -767 (2009).
92. 300 Ga. App. at 226, 684 S.E.2d at 378. The court of appeals also held the GTSA
did not preempt claims for tortious interference with contractual relations, conversion, and
breach of confidentiality and nondisclosure agreement. Id. at 226-27, 686 S.E.2d at 378-79.
93. Id. at 223-24, 684 S.E.2d at 376-77.
94. 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
95. Necaise, 300 Ga. App. at 224, 684 S.E.2d at 377.
96. Id. at 225, 684 S.E.2d at 377-78.
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should be dismissed, the district court also noted that "if a claim seeks
to remedy an injury caused not by the misappropriation of proprietary
information, . . . [the] claim cannot be said to be in conflict with the
GTSA."" In the present case, PEM alleged that Necaise breached his
fiduciary duty by soliciting PEM customers for a rival business, LUMA,
while Necaise was still an employee at PEM." The court of appeals
determined that Necaise's alleged solicitation was outside the scope of
the GTSA and not preempted by the GTSA." Thus, the court reasoned
that PEM's claim for breach of fiduciary duty, if proven, would entitle
PEM to relief.'" However, because LUMA demonstrated at trial that
PEM could not establish that LUMA owed PEM any duty, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of PEM's breach of fiduciary
duty claim.'o' The court of appeals decision in Necaise clarifies the
rule set forth in Diamond Power that claims made alongside a GTSA
claim should be dismissed when they conflict with the GTSA claim;
however, if the claims do not relate to "the misappropriation of
proprietary information," the claims should not be dismissed."o2
2. Georgia Court of Appeals Applied Two-Part Test in Address-

ing Misappropriation of CorporateOpportunity Claim. In Brewer
v. Insight Technology, Inc.," the court of appeals upheld a jury verdict
finding Darren Brewer liable to Insight Technology, Inc. (ITI) for
misappropriation of corporate opportunity and breach of fiduciary
In 1996 Gary Aliengena formed ITI as a trucking load-board
duty.'
business and hired Darren Brewer as marketing director. Soon
thereafter, Brewer became president of ITI. Brewer's duties as president
included overseeing the company's daily activities and managing the
In 1998 ITI develcompany's software and website development.'
oped FactorLoads as a freight factoring division. This division matched
small, independent truckers with one-time jobs and aimed to exploit a
97. Id. at 225, 684 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting Diamond Power, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 1345)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 225-26, 684 S.E.2d at 378. There is no breach of a fiduciary duty if an
employee merely makes plans to enter into a competing business. Id. at 225, 684 S.E.2d
at 378. However, an employee is not "entitled to solicit customers for a rival business
before the end of his employment." Id.
99. Id. at 226, 684 S.E.2d at 378.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 229, 684 S.E.2d at 380.
102. See id. at 225, 684 S.E.2d at 377.
103. 301 Ga. App. 694, 689 S.E.2d 330 (2009).
104. Id. at 694, 689 S.E.2d at 333.
105. Id. The business was based online and matched truckers with freight-line jobs as
the jobs became available. Id.
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small portion of the trucking market. In 2000 Brewer met Pat Hull,
owner of GetLoaded.com (GetLoaded), one of ITI's competitors in the
load-board business. Brewer attempted to negotiate an agreement with
Hull to allow ITI to advertise on Hull's website, but Hull declined. In
2002 Hull created his own factoring business, FreightCheck, LLC
(FreightCheck) to compete with ITI's FactorLoads. Subsequently,
Brewer became an equal partner in FreightCheck. Thereafter, he
managed and operated FreightCheck from the same building where ITI
was located, used the same resources for the two businesses, and
directed ITI employees to do work for FreightCheck.'c
In 2003 "Brewer [convinced] Aliengena to sell ITI to GetLoaded."o7
However, before the sale was finalized, Aliengena became aware of
Brewer's involvement with Hull and FreightCheck. Aliengena fired
Brewer and filed suit against him for breach of fiduciary duty and
A jury found Brewer
misappropriation of corporate opportunity.'
liable to ITI, and Brewer appealed."a
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals cited section 14-2831(a)(1)(C) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)"o and
stated, "A corporation may sue an officer or director for 'the appropriation, in violation of his duties, of any business opportunity of the
corporation.'""' Relying on the test enunciated by the supreme court
in Southeast Consultants, Inc. v. McCrary Engineering Corp.," the
court of appeals further stated that to impose liability for misappropriation of corporate opportunity, two prongs must be addressed: 1) "whether
the appropriated opportunity was in fact a business opportunity
rightfully belonging to the corporation," and 2) "if the ... opportunity
was a bona fide corporate opportunity, the court must determine
whether the corporate official violated a fiduciary duty in appropriating
that opportunity."113

106. Id.
107. Id. at 695, 689 S.E.2d at 333.
108. Id. at 694-95, 689 S.E.2d at 333.
109. Id. at 694-95, 689 S.E.2d at 333-34.
110. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-831(aX1XC) (2003 & Supp. 2010).
111. Brewer, 301 Ga. App. at 695,689 S.E.2d at 334 (emphasis added); see also O.C.GA
§ 14-2-831(aX1XC).
112. 246 Ga. 503, 273 S.E.2d 112 (1980).
113. Brewer, 301 Ga. App. at 695, 689 S.E.2d at 334 (emphasis added) (quoting
McCrary, 246 Ga. at 508, 273 S.E.2d at 117). However, "if [the] court finds that the
business opportunity was not a corporate opportunity, the directors or officers ... are
immune from liability." Id. (quoting McCrary, 246 Ga. at 508, 273 S.E.2d at 117).

54

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

In analyzing the first prong of the McCrary test,114 the court of
appeals defined "business opportunity" as an opportunity the corporation
is "financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the
corporation's business[,] is of practical advantage to it, [and] is one in
which the corporation has an interest or reasonable expectancy."' In
the present case, the court of appeals held that the evidence showed
GetLoaded and ITI were both engaged in the load-board business, ITI
had the financial means to undertake the opportunity of doing business
with GetLoaded, and ITI would have financially benefitted from a
merger with GetLoaded."6s Thus, ITI satisfied the first prong of the
McCrary test."' Regarding the second prong, the court held that as
a corporate officer, Brewer had a duty "not [to] engage in direct competition with the corporation's business.""' Because Brewer became a coowner of FreightCheck at the same time he was acting as president for
ITI, he breached his fiduciary duty to ITI.n9

D. Stock Ownership
1. Georgia Court of Appeals Held It is for a Jury to Decide
Whether a Company Acted in Good Faith When Deciding Not to
Award Benefits Under Stock Option Agreements. In Capital
Health Management Group, Inc. v. Hartley," the court of appeals
upheld a jury verdict finding Capital Health Management Group, Inc.
(Capital Health) did not act in good faith or with honest judgment in
deciding not to award a former employee her stock appreciation rights
Capital Health, a
under a deferred compensation agreement.''

114. McCrary, 246 Ga. at 508, 273 S.E.2d at 117.
115. Brewer, 301 Ga. App. at 696, 689 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Parks v. Multimedia
Techs., Inc., 239 Ga. App. 282, 288-89, 520 S.E.2d 517, 524 (1999)). Brewer argued that
the jury instruction was erroneous because the trial judge did not employ the language
from McCrary that states a business opportunity is one in which the corporation has "a
beachhead in the sense of a legal or equitable interest or expectancy growing out of a
preexisting right or relationship." Id. at 698, 689 S.E.2d at 335-36 (emphasis added)
(quoting McCrry, 246 Ga. at 508, 273 S.E.2d at 117) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court of appeals held that the "beachhead" language only pertains to cases involving
former officers and that the judge therefore properly instructed the jury. Id. at 698, 689
S.E.2d at 336; see also United Seal & Rubber Co. v. Bunting, 248 Ga. 814, 815, 285 S.E.2d
721, 722-23 (1982) (adopting "beachhead" language in a case involving a former officer).
116. Brewer, 301 Ga. App. at 696, 689 S.E.2d at 334.
117. Id. at 696, 689 S.E.2d at 335.
118. Id. at 696-97, 689 S.E.2d at 335.
119. Id. at 697, 689 S.E.2d at 335.
120. 301 Ga. App. 812, 689 S.E.2d 107 (2009).
121. Id. at 816-17, 823, 689 S.E.2d at 111, 115.
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private corporation, provided management services to home healthcare
agencies. The company hired Deborah Moss Hartley in 1997 as a
regional director of operations and within two years promoted her to
regional vice president of operations. Capital Health and Hartley
entered into a "Stock Appreciation Rights Agreement" (Agreement) that
provided Hartley would be paid the value of 60,000 shares of stock in
Capital Health upon the sale of all or substantially all of the Capital
Health common stock if Hartley was still employed at the time the stock
was sold or had been terminated as the result of a disability. The
Agreement also provided that a compensation committee (Committee)
composed of members of Capital Health's board of directors would
administer, interpret, adopt, and revise the Agreement. Additionally,
the term "disability" would be defined by the Committee."s
In 2000 Hartley began experiencing severe fatigue and headaches and
was soon diagnosed with fibromyalgia. By November 2000, Hartley
could not carry out her work responsibilities and ultimately informed
Capital Health she would not be able to return to work. Capital Health
received a physician's certification documenting Hartley's fibromyalgia.
Capital Health then notified Hartley that she would receive a termination letter. Hartley testified that Capital Health told her she was being
terminated due to her disability. In June 2005, Capital Health sold all
of its common stock; however, it did not notify or pay Hartley the value
of the 60,000 shares promised to her under the Agreement. Capital
Health asserted that because the Agreement gave it discretionary
decision-making power, it had the right to withhold payment with
respect to the 60,000 shares."
As decided in Planning Technologies, Inc. v. Korman,'" an agreement may provide for a board of directors to have final and conclusive
decision-making authority with regard to a stock option plan.12 5
However, any decision made by the board must be made in good faith
and in the exercise of honest judgment.1 26 Hartley sued Capital
Health to recover the $343,861 value of the subject shares. A jury
returned a verdict that Capital Health did not act in good faith or with

122. Id. at 813-14, 689 S.E.2d at 109.
123. Id. at 814-16, 689 S.E.2d at 110-11.
124. 290 Ga. App. 715, 660 S.E.2d 39 (2008). See generally Paul A. Quir6s et al.,
Business Associations,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REV. 35, 39-40 (2008)
(discussing the decision in Korman).
125. See 290 Ga. App. at 719 & n.2, 660 S.E.2d at 42-43 & n.2.
126. Id. at 720, 660 S.E.2d at 43.
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honest judgment when it decided not to pay Hartley the money owed to
her under the Agreement. Capital Health appealed.12
First, Capital Health argued that whether it abused its decisionmaking authority under the Agreement was a legal question to be
decided by a judge, not a fact question for the jury. 8 The court of
appeals disagreed and held that, as in any contract case, the question of
good faith is for a jury to decide." Second, Capital Health argued
that Hartley was fired as a result of corporate reorganization, not
because of her disability; therefore, the Agreement did not require her
to be paid the value of the stock."a However, the court held there was
no evidence to support Capital Health's argument.'"' Thus, the court
allowed the jury's determination that Hartley was terminated due to her
disability to stand." Capital Health further argued that there was
no evidence to support the jury's finding that Capital Health acted out
of an improper pecuniary motive. 3 3 According to the court, "there was
evidence that Capital Health's decision to deny payment to Hartley
under the Agreement was not made in good faith and did not involve the
exercise of honest judgment."" Specifically, when the sale of Capital
Health stock occurred, Capital Health's three shareholders split the
One of the
money not paid out to employees such as Hartley."a
company's shareholders, Tbdd Weibusch, approved the termination of
Hartley and received one-third of the stock value owed to her under the
Agreement."a Accordingly, the court held the jury was entitled to find
that Capital Health did not act in good faith when deciding not to pay
Hartley the money due under the Agreement." 7 The decision in
Capital Health reaffirmed the holding in Korman and also established
that a jury, not a judge, is to determine "whether a party exercised good

127. CapitalHealth, 301 Ga. App. at 816-17, 689 S.E.2d at 111.
128. Id. at 817, 689 S.E.2d at 111.
129. Id. at 817-18, 689 S.E.2d at 112; see also, e.g., Camp v. Peetluk, 262 Ga. App. 345,
585 S.E.2d 704 (2003); Rogers v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 247 Ga. App. 631, 545 S.E.2d
51 (2001).
130. CapitalHealth, 301 Ga. App. at 819, 689 S.E.2d at 113.
131. See id. at 820, 689 S.E.2d at 113.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 821, 689 S.E.2d at 114. In Korman the court of appeals held that "a decision
[is] not made in good faith if [it is] based on an improper pecuniary motive." 290 Ga. App.
at 720, 660 S.E.2d at 43.
134. CapitalHealth, 301 Ga. App. at 822, 689 S.E.2d at 115.
135. Id. at 816, 689 S.E.2d at 111.
136. Id. at 821-22, 689 S.E.2d at 114.
137. Id. at 821-22, 689 S.E.2d at 114-15.
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faith and honest judgment in the performance" of a stock option agreement.1as
2. Georgia Securities Act Not a Basis for Liability When
Purchaser of Stock Knows of Seller's Misrepresentations. In
Fernandez v. WebSingularity, Inc.,as the court of appeals applied
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(a)(1)"a and held that a purchaser of stock could not
rely on the Georgia Securities Act of 1973141 "if . . . [tihe purchaser
knew of the untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a
statement of a material fact."'4 2 Waldemar Fernandez purchased
$319,999.95 of stock in WebSingularity, Inc. (WebSingularity).
Fernandez alleged he purchased the stock because WebSingularity CEO
Kenneth Gavranovic represented that Fernandez would purchase onethird of the company's issued and outstanding stock. After purchasing
the stock, Fernandez learned that he in fact had only purchased about
7% of the stock. Subsequently, Fernandez withdrew his offer to buy the
stock and demanded the return of his money. WebSingularity refused
to return Fernandez's money, and Fernandez filed suit, alleging a
The trial court granted
violation of the Georgia Securities Act."
WebSingularity's motion to dismiss and Fernandez appealed.'"
In support of his Georgia Securities Act claim, Fernandez relied on
Meason v. Gilbert,'4 in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that
"[t]o allow a purchaser to waive by contract at the time of purchase all
violations of the Securities Act would eviscerate the very protections
afforded by the statute and such a purported waiver would be void and

138. Id. at 817-18, 689 S.E.2d at 112.
139. 299 Ga. App. 11, 681 S.E.2d 717 (2009).
140. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(aX1) (2000) (repealed 2008).
141. O.C.GA. ch. 10-5 (2000) (repealed 2008). The Georgia Securities Act was repealed
in its entirety in 2008, Ga. S. Bill 358, Reg. Sees., 2008 Ga. Laws 381, and replaced by the
Georgia Uniform Securities Act. O.C.GA ch. 10-5 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
142. Fernandez,299 Ga. App. at 19, 681 S.E.2d at 724 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(aX1) (repealed 2008).
143. Fernandez, 299 Ga. App. at 11-12, 681 S.E.2d at 720. Fernandez's complaint
alleged four additional theories of recovery: "(1) money had and received; (2) breach of an
agreement to rescind; (3) conversion;. . . and ([4]) fraud and deceit.* Id. at 12, 681 S.E.2d
at 720 (footnote omitted). Fernandez also sought punitive damages and litigation expenses.
Id. Subsequently, Fernandez voluntarily dismissed the fraud and deceit claim. Id. The
trial court dismissed all allegations in the complaint. See id. at 13, 681 S.E.2d at 720. The
court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the recission claim but reversed the dismissal of
Fernandez's other claims. Id.
144. Id. at 11-12, 681 S.E.2d at 720.
145. 236 Ga. 862, 226 S.E.2d 49 (1976).
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of no effect.""' 0 In the present case, Fernandez received and executed
a subscription agreement that did not show Fernandez would receive a
one-third stock interest in WebSingularity. Additionally, Fernandez did
not claim WebSingularity prevented him from reading the agreement or
that the language was ambiguous. Therefore, based on the subscription
agreement, Fernandez knew he would not receive one-third of WebSinguNonetheless, based on Meason, Fernandez
larity's issued stock."
argued that WebSingularity violated the Georgia Securities Act because
if WebSingularity was permitted to orally promise a certain amount of
stock, but actually showed a lesser amount in the subscription agreement, it would render the Georgia Security Act meaningless.4 s
In rejecting Fernandez's argument, the court of appeals first noted
that the supreme court in Meason interpreted the Georgia Securities Act
prior to the 1973 amendment 49 to the Act.'m In fact, the supreme
court in Meason expressly stated that it had "no opinion about whether
the result would be the same in the case of a knowing relinquishment
of rights.""'' In contrast to the pre-1973 statute used in Meason, the
1973 amended version of the Georgia Securities Act applicable in the
present case does provide for an exception to liability when a "purchaser
[knows] of [an] untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a
statement of a material fact."' 2 In the present case, Fernandez
received a subscription agreement that stated he would only receive
Even
about 7% of the company's issued and outstanding stock.'
though Fernandez may have relied on Gavronavic's oral statements that
he would own one-third of WebSingularity's stock, based on the
subscription agreement, Fernandez "knew" for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 105-14(a)(1) that he was subscribing for only about 7% of that stock."'

146. Fernandez,299 Ga. App. at 18,681 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Meason, 236 Ga. at 863,
226 S.E.2d at 50) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 19, 681 S.E.2d at 724-25.
148. See id. at 17-18, 681 S.E.2d at 723-24.
149. Ga. H.R. Bill 264, Reg. Sess., 1973 Ga. Laws 1202 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. ch. 10-5 (2009 & Supp. 2010)).
150. Fernandez,299 Ga. App. at 18, 681 S.E.2d at 724; see GA. CODE ANN. § 97-112(b)
(1972) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. ch. 10-5 (2009 & Supp. 2010)). The language of
the statute applied in Meason did not provide an exception to liability when the purchaser
knew of an untrue statement. See Fernandez,299 Ga. App. at 18,681 S.E.2d at 724; GA.
CODE ANN. § 97-112(b).
151. Fernandez,299 Ga. App. at 19,681 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Meason, 236 Ga. at 863
n.2, 226 S.E.2d at 50 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. O.C.G.A. § 10-5-14(aXl) (repealed 2008).
153. Fernandez, 299 Ga. App. at 12, 18, 226 S.E.2d at 720, 724.
154. Id. at 19, 226 S.E.2d at 724-25.
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Therefore, the court of appeals held WebSingularity had not violated
O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12(a).x1s
The Georgia Securities Act as applied in Fernandez was repealed in
2008.'" However, it is likely that a court would make the same ruling
on similar facts because the Georgia Uniform Securities Act,'57 which
replaced the prior act, also provides a seller is not liable if the purchaser
"[knew] the untruth or omission."1se
III.

LirrED LIABiLiTY COMPANY

In Brock Built, LLC v. Blake,159 the court of appeals applied the
business judgment rule to determine whether a limited liability
Brock Built, LLC
company's officer breached his fiduciary duty."
in 2003 and
manager
(Brock Built) hired Henry Blake as a construction
with
connection
In
in
2005.
company
promoted Blake to president of the
that
provided
contract
into
a
the promotion, the two parties entered
Brock Built would pay Blake a base salary and incentive compensation,
which was a percentage of the company's profit margin. 6' The
contract stipulated Blake would act as the company's president through
2007, and the contract would automatically renew for one-year terms
after 2007. The contract also allowed for either party to terminate the
relationship at any time, with or without cause, but if Brock Built
terminated Blake without cause, Blake would be entitled to severance
payments equal to one year of his annual salary amount.1 62
In 2006 Brock Built severed its relationship with Blake and failed to
pay the incentive compensation and severance set forth in the contract.
Blake sued for breach of contract for the company's failure to pay the
severance and full amount of incentive compensation. Blake also
claimed breach of fiduciary duty in determining the company's annual
profit for purposes of the incentive compensation. Brock Built counterclaimed, also alleging breach of contract and fiduciary duties." Brock
Built claimed Blake breached his fiduciary duties by 1) accelerating 2005
profits for the purpose of increasing his incentive compensation and 2)

155. Id. at 12, 226 S.E.2d at 720; see O.C.G.A. § 10-5-12(a) (repealed 2008).
156. Ga. S. Bill 358 at § 1, 2008 Ga. Laws at 382.
157. O.C.GA ch. 10-5 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
158. O.C.GA § 10-5-58(c) (2009).
159. 300 Ga. App. 816, 686 S.E.2d 425 (2009).
160. Id. at 822, 686 S.E.2d at 430.
161. Id. at 817, 686 S.E.2d at 427. "The [clontract defined 'profit margin' as 'the net
profit of the Company before federal and state income taxes.'" Id.
162. Id. at 817, 686 S.E.2d at 427-28.
163. Id. at 817-18, 686 S.E.2d at 428.
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failing to properly manage the company's affairs.'6 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Blake on his claim for breach of
contract and against Brock Built's counterclaims. Brock Built apThe court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant of
pealed.'"
summary judgment in regards to Blake's breach of contract claim for
severance pay but held the incentive compensation claim presented a
jury question.66
In addressing Brock Built's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duties,
the court of appeals applied the business judgment rule, which "affords
an officer the presumption that he or she acted in good faith, and
absolves the officer of personal liability unless it is established that he
or she engaged in fraud, bad faith[,] or an abuse of discretion."16 7
Additionally, the court stated that "[allegations amounting to mere
negligence, carelessness, or 'lackadaisical performance' are insufficient
as a matter of law.""
The court held that Blake's conduct did not
amount to fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion." Specifically, the
court noted that Brock Built did not offer any evidence that would
support its claim of breach of a fiduciary duty.170 The court cited

Thrner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 71 to support the
proposition that the fact Blake would gain personally from the actions
he took did not in itself preclude the application of the business
judgment rule.172 Furthermore, the court held Brock Built's claim that
Blake did not properly perform his duties as an officer of the company
"amounted at best to a showing of negligent or careless performance,"
which is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.'
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial

164. Id. at 821, 686 S.E.2d at 430.
165. Id. at 818, 686 S.E.2d at 428.
166. Id. at 818, 821, 686 S.E.2d at 428, 430. The court of appeals stated the evidence
showed that Brock Built terminated Blake without cause and therefore owed Blake the
severance pay as guaranteed by the contract. Id. at 818, 686 S.E.2d at 428. However, the
court of appeals held Blake was not entitled to summary judgment on the incentive
compensation claim because a jury question existed as to whether Brock Built paid Blake
the full incentive compensation. Id. at 820-21, 686 S.E.2d at 429-30.
167. Id. at 821-22, 686 S.E.2d at 430.
168. Id. at 822, 686 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Medserv Corp. v. Nemnom, 1997 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 29924, at *9 (11th Cir. 1998)).
169. Id. at 822, 686 S.E.2d at 431.

170. Id.
171. 627 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
172. Brock Built, 300 Ga. App. at 822-23, 686 S.E.2d at 431.
173. Id. at 823, 868 S.E.2d at 431.
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court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Blake on the breach of
fiduciary duties counterclaim."
Interestingly, the court of appeals in Brock Built cited O.C.G.A. §§ 142-830's and 14-2-842 17 in addressing a corporate officer's fiduciary
duties.'" The code sections cited by the court of appeals pertain to
8
corporations.17
However, O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305179 governs Brock
Built, a limited liability company." Since the language of § 14-11-305
is almost identical to that in §§ 14-2-830 and 14-2-842, the court of
appeals extended the application of the business judgment rule in
similar situations to limited liability companies.
IV.

PARTNERSHIP

A. Each Partnerin a PartnershipOwes a Fiduciary Duty of Good
Faith to Each Other Partner
8 the court of appeals reaffirmed the longIn Asgharneya v. Hadavi,x'
standing principle that each partner in a general partnership owes a
duty of good faith to the other partners in the partnership.' In 2001
Asghar Asgharneya and Javad Hadavi formed a partnership in which
each party contributed equal capital and agreed to split equally the
profits from a check-cashing business. Asgharneya and Hadavi,
however, did not execute a written document to memorialize the
partnership-all communications were verbal. For three years, the
business grew steadily and profitably, averaging $100,000 a year in
profits. In 2004 the parties agreed to change the way they ran the
business and orally agreed to a new business plan. According to the new
plan, each partner would operate the business for one month at a time,
alternating months. The partner working at the store would be
responsible for all expenses and would keep all profits from the month
worked."s

174. Id.
175. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (2003).
176. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-842 (2003).
177. Brock Built, 300 Ga. App. at 821, 686 S.E.2d at 430.
178. See O.C.G.A. H0 14-2-830, -842.
179. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 (2003).
180. See O.C.G.A. § 14-11-305. The language of § 14-11-305 nearly mirrors the
language of §§ 14-2-830 and 14-2-842. CompareO.C.G.A. § 14-11-305, with O.C.G.A. §§ 142-830, -842.
181. 298 Ga. App. 693, 680 S.E.2d 866 (2009).
182. Id. at 697, 680 S.E.2d at 870.
183. Id. at 693-94, 680 S.E.2d at 868.
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Pursuant to the agreement, Asgharneya worked the first month,
starting in May of 2004. However, when Hadavi returned to work, he
found that Asgharneya had boarded up the store and opened up his own
check-cashing business in competition with the old business. Hadavi
then filed suit, alleging breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment. The trial court held the parties had modified their original
oral agreement and that they did not agree to terminate the original
agreement as Asgharneya claimed. Thus, the trial court found for
Hadavi and awarded him damages in the form of lost profits and
attorney fees.'8a
On appeal, Asgharneya argued that the partnership was a partnership
at will, terminable at any time, and that he therefore could not be liable
In rejecting this argument, the court of
for breach of contract."
appeals conceded that the partnership was terminable any time by
either party because it was a partnership at will.18 However, the
court also noted that this right to terminate "must be exercised in good
faith.""' The court stated, "Any partnership agreement includes, as a
matter of law, an agreement for each partner to act in 'the utmost good
faith' toward the other partner. The power ... to dissolve the partnership .. . must be exercised in good faith."'

In this case, Asgharneya

terminated his relationship with Hadavi to take advantage of a
profitable business opportunity and excluded his partner from participating." Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower
court and held Asgharneya did not act in good faith when terminating
his partnership with Hadavi."' The court of appeals decision in
Asgharneya serves as a reminder that despite having the ability to
terminate an agreement at any time, partners in a general partnership
owe each other a duty of good faith.

184. Id. at 694-95, 680 S.E.2d at 869.
185. Id. at 697, 680 S.E.2d at 870.
186. Id.; see Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 437, 405 S.E.2d 698, 702 (1991)
(explaining that a partnership formed by oral agreement and for an indefinite period of
time is a partnership at will terminable by either party).
187. Asgharneya, 298 Ga. App. at 697, 680 S.E.2d at 870.
188. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Arford, 199 Ga. App. at 437-38,405 S.E.2d at 702);
see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that "[n]ot honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is .. . the standard of behavior").
189. See A4gharneya, 298 Ga. App. at 694-95, 680 S.E.2d at 869.
190. Id. at 697-98, 680 S.E.2d at 871.
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B. A PartnerServed in a Subsequent Lawsuit Can Be Held
Individually Liable for a PriorJudgment Against the Partnership
In J.T 'lurner Construction Co. v. Summerour,19' the court of
appeals addressed a question that had not been brought before the court
for nearly 100 years.192 J.T. Turner Construction Company, Inc.
(Turner) filed suit against SWI Partners (SWI), a general partnership,
and obtained a judgment against Ernest Burns, one of SWI's partners.
Turner subsequently filed suit against Randy Hatcher and Orlando
Summerour, the other SWI partners. Turner alleged that Hatcher and
Summerour were jointly and severally liable to SWI for the judgment
rendered against it and moved for summary judgment." "The trial
court ... denied Turner's motion, finding that Turner [must] 'present a
prima facie case, and prove the elements of the counts alleged . . . in the
original suit'" against SWI.'" Agreeing with Hatcher and Summerour,
the trial court held that they "could not be held liable until they had
their day in court."'9 Turner appealed.'
The court of appeals began its discussion by noting three rules of law
that apply to general partnerships: 1) all partners are jointly and
severally liable for the partnership's debts, obligations, and liabilities;" 2) a judgment entered against a general partnership binds the
assets of the partnership as well as the "assets of any general partner[]
... properly served in the suit;" and 3) a general partner's assets are not
bound unless the general partner "had his day in court" or in some way
waived the need for service." The court further stated that, notwithstanding the defendants' argument, "partners not personally served in
the original suit or who do not appear in the original trial against the
partnership are nonetheless subject to be sued individually."'9e
Next, the court cited its decision in Lamar-Rankin Drug Co. v.
Copeland,20"which held that "a partner served in a subsequent lawsuit
can be held individually liable for a prior judgment" entered against the

191. 301 Ga. App. 323, 687 S.E.2d 612 (2009).
192. See id. at 324, 687 S.E.2d at 614.
193. Id. at 323, 687 S.E.2d at 613.
194. Id.
195. Id. (internal qiotation marks omitted).
196. Id.
197. O.C.G.A. § 14-8-15(a) (2003); Summerour, 301 Ga. App. at 323,687 S.E.2d at 613.
198. Summerour, 301 Ga. App. at 323-24, 687 S.E.2d at 613 (quoting Sugarman v.
Shaginaw, 151 Ga. App. 621, 626, 260 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
199. Id. at 324, 687 S.E.2d at 614.
200. 7 Ga. App. 567, 67 S.E.2d 703 (1910).
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partnership if the plaintiff proves: 1) the individual sued was a partner,
2) the original claim against the partnership was proved, and 3) the
account sued upon was the same as in the original suit.2o' Applying
the test in Copeland to the facts in Summerour, the court held that
Hatcher and Summerour were both partners of SWI, Turner proved his
claim in the original suit, and the account sued upon in the subsequent
suit was identical to the original suit.m Because Thrner could prove
the three elements of the test set forth in Copeland, Turner was entitled
to summary judgment.m The court of appeals decision in Summerour
is significant because it reaffirms a century-old precedent with respect
to what must be proved for a partner in a general partnership to be held
liable for a judgment rendered against the partnership in a prior suit.
V. AGENCY

In Eayrs v. Absolute Roofing, Inc.,m the court of appeals applied
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-23' in holding that an agent was not personally
liable when acting on behalf of a principal. 2 ' Allan Eayrs needed
repair work done to fix the leaking roof of a house he owned. Eayrs
contacted several companies to do the work, one of which was Absolute
Roofing, Inc. (Absolute Roofing). Don Harris, acting on behalf of
Absolute Roofing, drafted a proposal for Eayrs. Eayrs accepted the
proposal and paid Absolute Roofing for the work. However, the roof
continued to leak after the work was performed. Eayrs sued Absolute
Roofing and Harris. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Harris, and Eayrs appealed.2 0
The court of appeals stated that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-6-23, "if the
principal is disclosed and the agent professes to act for him, . . . the act
The evidence established
will be held to be the act of the principal."
that Eayrs dealt with Absolute Roofing as a disclosed principal2" and
that Harris did not hold himself out to be other than an agent of

201. Summerour, 301 Ga. App. at 324, 687 S.E.2d at 614 (citing Copeland,7 Ga. App.
at 568, 67 S.E.2d at 704).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 300 Ga. App. 825, 686 S.E.2d 432 (2009).
205. O.C.G.A. § 10-6-23 (2009).
206. Eayrs, 300 Ga. App. at 826, 686 S.E.2d at 433.
207. Id. at 825-26, 686 S.E.2d at 433.
208. Id. at 826,686 S.E.2d at 433. Compare O.C.G.A. § 10-6-23, with O.C.G.A. § 10-685 (2009) (stating an agent can be individually liable when acting outside his scope of
authority).
209. Eayrs, 300 Ga. App. at 826, 686 S.E.2d at 434.
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Absolute Roofing."'o The court affirmed summary judgment with
respect to Harris because Eayrs knew Harris acted as an agent for
Absolute Roofing; therefore, Harris could not be held personally liable for
Absolute Roofing's work.21' Thus, the court of appeals opinion in Eayrs
affirms the principle that an agent will not be held personally liable for
his acts if the agent is acting on behalf of a disclosed principal.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

A. Remedies at Law Limited When a "SophisticatedPurchaser"Fails
to Exercise Due Diligence in DiscoveringPossible Discrepanciesin a
PurchaseAgreement
In A & B Blind & Drapery Co. v. B & B Glass & Storefronts, Inc.,212
the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that a purchaser was
only entitled to set off the business purchase price when the seller
breached warranties under the purchase agreement.213 A & B Blind
& Drapery Co. (A & B) sought to purchase B & B Glass and Storefronts,
Inc. (B & B). The two parties entered into an asset purchase agreement
(Agreement), pursuant to which A & B purchased B & B's assets for
$347,107. A & B paid $150,000 in cash and gave B & B a promissory
note for $197,107. The Agreement included a statement of accounts
receivable and payable and several provisions addressing B & B's debts
and obligations. Specifically, the Agreement stated that A & B would
not assume any of B & B's debts or obligations. Furthermore, the
Agreement provided for a set-off against the promissory note for any
payments A & B might be required to pay with respect to any such
debts, obligations, or liabilities of B & B.214 The Agreement also
contained a clause in which B & B warranted that its financial
statements were accurate and that in the event of a breach of the
warranty, A & B would "have the right to invoke any remedy allowed at

law or in equity.

2 15

Approximately two months after closing under the Agreement, A & B
executed a replacement promissory note due to an increase in B & B's
obligations not known at the time of closing. The replacement note was
for $137,000. A & B failed to make any payments on the note. B & B
subsequently filed suit to recover the value of the principal, plus interest
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 826, 686 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 826, 686 S.E.2d at 434.
298 Ga. App. 210, 679 S.E.2d 782 (2009).
Id. at 212-13, 679 S.E.2d at 784-85.
Id. at 210, 679 S.E.2d at 783.
Id. at 211, 679 S.E.2d at 783.
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and attorney fees. A & B asserted its right to set off uncollectible
accounts receivable and undisclosed debts under the Agreement and
counterclaimed for breach of warranty, fraud, and misrepresentation.
The trial court found that A & B was entitled to a $29,797.34 set-off and
entered judgment in favor of B & B for $107,202.66, plus interest and
attorney fees. 1 e The trial court rejected A & B's claims for additional
damages because A & B "failed to exercise due diligence to discover the
discrepancies in payables and receivables.""
On appeal, A & B argued that B & B misrepresented its accounts
payable and receivable and that A & B decided to purchase the business
in large part because of the stated value of the business.218 A & B
further argued that the trial court erred in limiting its remedy to a setoff when the Agreement expressly provided for "any remedy allowed at
law."219 In upholding the trial court's ruling, the court of appeals
stated the evidence showed that A & B did not "exercise[] due diligence
to discover [the] discrepancies."'
Specifically, the transcript revealed
A & B's president, Jesse M. Chastain, to be an experienced accountant
who had purchased five businesses prior to the agreement with B & B.
Furthermore, Chastain testified he did not thoroughly review B & B's
records.22' Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly rejected A & B's claims, other than its set-off claim, in light of
the evidence before the trial court and that it did not erroneously
interpret the Agreement.2' The practical lesson from A & B Blind &
Draperyis that "sophisticated purchasers" looking to purchase the assets
of another business should review the target's books and records,
including the business's accounts receivable and payable, in valuing a
business to ensure the application of remedies negotiated in the
acquisition agreement.

216. Id. at 211, 679 S.E.2d at 783-84. The trial court determined the set-off amount
of $29,797.34 by "setting off certain receivables and costs of collection." Id. at 211, 679
S.E.2d at 784.
217. Id. at 211-12, 679 S.E.2d at 784.
218. 1& at 212-13, 679 S.E.2d at 784.
219. 1& at 211-12, 679 S.E.2d at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. at 213, 679 S.E.2d at 785.
221. I&
222. Id.
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B. Noncompete Clause Enforced When Seller Attempted to Disguise
His Ownership in Another Company to Avoid the Restrictions of the
Noncompete
In Corey v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision that the seller of a business was liable
for violating a noncompete clause when the seller attempted to
circumvent the clause by disguising his ownership in another company." In Corey Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. (Clear Channel) entered
into an agreement with Corey Media, Inc. (Corey Media), owned by
William Corey, whereby Clear Channel purchased Corey Media's
The agreement included a noncompete clause
billboard assets.
competing with Clear Channel for two years in
from
Corey
prohibiting
the billboard business in Atlanta, Georgia. However, the noncompete
clause did not prohibit employees, officers, or directors of Corey Media
from competing with Clear Channel in their individual capacity. As
consideration for the agreement not to compete, Clear Channel paid
Corey $2 million.'
Before the sale to Clear Channel, Corey Media formed a new company,
U.S. Media, allegedly owned by Diane Smith-McIver (Mclver). However,
evidence at trial established that Mclver never actually owned or ran
U.S. Media. The evidence also established that Corey funded U.S. Media
with the proceeds of the sale of Corey Media to Clear Channel.
Furthermore, Corey used Corey Media employees to run U.S. Media. In
the two years after the sale of Corey Media to Clear Channel, U.S.
Media purchased nine billboards in the restricted Atlanta area.2m
Another of Corey's companies, Corey Airport Services, submitted a bid
for concession advertising inside the Atlanta airport. Subsequently,
Clear Channel sued Corey and Corey Airport Services for breaching the
noncompete clause, "alleg[ing] that the advertising displays inside the
airport were 'outdoor advertising.'" 7 Corey denied that the airport
Clear Channel
advertisement constituted an outdoor billboard.
U.S. Media
and
Corey
responded by amending its complaint, alleging
Atlanta
nine
to
the
violated the noncompete clause with respect
violated
Channel
billboards. Corey counterclaimed, alleging that Clear
the noncompete clause by suing him. The trial court dismissed Corey's
counterclaim because the noncompete clause placed no duty on Clear

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

299 Ga. App. 487, 683 S.E.2d 27 (2009).
Id. at 489, 492, 683 S.E.2d at 30-32.
Id. at 487, 683 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 488, 683 S.E.2d at 30-31.
Id. at 488, 683 S.E.2d at 30.
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Channel not to sue." A jury then awarded $2 million in damages to
Clear Channel for Corey's breach of the noncompete clause.2 2
On appeal, Corey again argued that Clear Channel violated the
noncompete clause by suing him.o In upholding the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals noted that the parties' agreement did not
include "an implied duty which Clear Channel violated by filing suit
against Corey." 1 The noncompete clause represented a promise by
Corey in exchange for the $2 million paid by Clear Channel; thus, the $2
million, not a promise not to sue, constituted the consideration for
Corey's promise. 2 " Furthermore, the court noted that Corey's argument on appeal was irrelevant to whether he breached the noncompete
clause.3 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision finding Corey liable to Clear Channel for breach of the
noncompete clause.2"
C. Suit Filed on Behalf of a Nonprofit CorporationMust be Made by
a Board of Directors ProperlyAuthorized to Act on Behalf of the
Corporation
In Victory Drive Deliverance Temple, Inc. v. Jackson,"' a group of
church members claiming to be the church's board of directors fired the
church's newly hired senior pastor. However, the senior pastor,
Theodore Jackson Sr., refused to leave, arguing the group's action did
not bind the church because the group was not an authorized board of
directors pursuant to the church's articles of incorporation. The
plaintiffs, the group of individuals acting as the board of directors,
consisted of John Anderson, Kathryn Anderson, Della Mae Wheeler,
Carlene Wilkinson, and Carol Davis. Two of the five group members
represented original board members under the church's articles of
incorporation-Kathryn Anderson and Wheeler. The plaintiffs argued
that the newly formed group represented a valid board of directors
because Kathryn Anderson and Wheeler ratified the election of the three

228. Id. at 488-89, 683 S.E.2d at 30-31.
229. Id. at 489, 683 S.E.2d at 30.
230. Id. at 490, 683 S.E.2d at 31. At trial Corey argued he did not violate the
noncompete clause because Mclver acted in her own individual capacity in running U.S.
Media. Id at 489, 683 S.E.2d at 30-31. Corey did not make this argument on appeal. See
id. at 490, 683 S.E.2d at 31. Instead, Corey only argued that Clear Channel violated the
covenant by suing him. Id.
231. Id. at 490-91, 683 S.E.2d at 31-32.
232. Id. at 491, 683 S.E.2d at 32.
233. See id. at 491-92, 683 S.E.2d at 32.
234. Id. at 492, 683 S.E.2d at 32.
235. 298 Ga. App. 563, 680 S.E.2d 588 (2009).
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other individuals. However, the church's articles of incorporation
provided that to be binding, an action of the board must be approved by
a majority of the board members." The articles also provided that
the current board would consist of four members-Jackson, Mary Lee
Anderson, Kathryn Anderson, and Wheeler."
Jackson alleged the
group did not constitute a properly formed board of directors because
only two of the board members ratified the election of the three new
board members. Thus, the board's action did not constitute a majority,
and the alleged newly formed board could not bind the church.'
Jackson moved for the suit to be dismissed, and the trial court granted
his motion.289
In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the court of appeals noted the
long-standing rule that "[aill civil actions must be brought by a proper
party plaintiff."o In the present case, the articles of incorporation
required the consent of a majority of the board members to an action
Because the plaintiffs in this case did not
binding the church."
constitute a properly formed board of directors pursuant to the church's
articles of incorporation, they could not properly bring suit on behalf of
the church; in other words, they were not a proper party plaintiff.2 '
Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit.u The court
of appeals decision in this case illustrates the need for all companies to
comply with their internal governing documents in order to give validity
to the actions of the board of directors.

236. Id. at 563-64 & n.1, 680 S.E.2d at 589-90 & n.1.
237. Id. at 563-64, 680 S.E.2d at 589. The articles of incorporation provided the senior
pastor of the church would be chairman of the board. Id. at 563, 680 S.E.2d at 589.
Originally, Bishop Anderson, the church's senior pastor prior to Jackson, held the title of
chairman. Id. However, at the time of the action, Jackson held the title because of his
position as senior pastor. See id.
238. Id. at 563-64, 680 S.E.2d at 589.
239. Id. at 563, 680 S.E.2d at 589.
240. Id. at 566, 680 8.E.2d at 591; Turner v. Kelley, 212 Ga. 175, 176, 91 S.E.2d 356,
357 (1956).
241. Jackson, 298 Ga. App. at 563-64, 680 S.E.2d at 589.
242. Id. at 563-64, 566, 680 S.E.2d at 589-91.
243. Id. at 564, 566, 680 S.E.2d at 590-91.
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